The authors aver that the non-predictability of dangerousness seems ground enough to abandon the use of restraint. We have had the experience of seeing the avoidance of physical restraint leading to physical violence and even death of persons in the vicinity. The predictability of dangerousness like that of suicide, beseeches discovery through better research, not dismissal. Certainly there are warning signs in many cases of violence.
After quoting Floud, the authors state that "when patients deemed to be dangerous are released... not more than 50%, and even fewer than them have caused harm as predicted". The sentence is grammatically incorrect and logically incomplete. In any case, no valid argument against restraint can be made that looks upon a fraction of about one half of patients turning out dangerous as predicted, as being unworthy of notice. Later, on the question of lack of insight they state that "(this) is debatable, if not rejected forthright" ground for restraint. Rejected forthright on what grounds, might one ask? In fact, in the practice of psychiatry, the lack of insight is often the principal reason why intervention against the patients will becomes necessary. Certainly, the intervention should be humane.
The authors advocate "redefining dangerous and disruptive behavior" but avoid any attempt in this direction in their work. While endorsing the need for pharmacological intervention as a preferred mode of restraint to the physical one, 1 think it is worth recording that physical restraints are in very many cases needed to be able to bring a patient to the doctor in the first place (Parks, 1990) .
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Sir, We (Akhtar & Jagawat, 1993) had the modest aim to highlight the anxiety and fear generated by the mentally ill in the general public, which leads to unnecessary restraint of mental patients. In our study, 60% of the cases were judged to have inadequate reasons for being brought restrained to the outpatient department.
Identification of a dangerous person is the greatest unresolved problem faced by the criminal justice system. There seem to be no psychiatric criteria for dangerousness, which may be sufficiently effective in the real social setting. The incidence of false negative and false positive prediction of violence makes individual prediction impossible in most cases (Manahan, 1973; Steadman, 1977) . There are situations, however, when prediction of violence for only the near future may be more accurate, if there is a history of recent violence and the individual is likely to remain in the same environment. Given the inherently unresolved nature of 'dangerous and disruptive' behavior and the impetus on the human rights of the mentally ill, it must be left to the judiciary to make the criteria explicit, and we believe that in doing so, the clinical judgement of the psychiatrists must be given paramount importance. Floud (1981) reviewed many studies and concluded that when serious offenders with formidable criminal record of violence were set at liberty, the maximum chanceof prediction of violence to be true was 50% and was much less in most of the studies. It was not a single study as has been mentioned inadvertently in our report.
